## Econ 802

## Second Midterm

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All questions have equal weight. If anything is unclear, please ask.

1. The elasticity of scale is closely related to the shape of the cost curves.
(a) Let $x^{*}$ be the cost-minimizing input bundle for the output $y^{*}$. Prove that $\mathrm{e}\left(\mathrm{x}^{*}\right)=$ $A C\left(y^{*}\right) / M C\left(y^{*}\right)$ where $e(x)$ is the elasticity of scale, $A C$ is long run average cost, and MC is long run marginal cost. Hint: use the fact that MC equals the Lagrange multiplier in the cost minimization problem.
(b) Use the result in (a) to give a short proof of the fact that a Cobb-Douglas production function cannot yield a U-shaped long run average cost curve. Explain graphically.
2. $\quad$ At prices $p^{A}=(1,1)$, Joe Consumer chooses the bundle $x^{A}=(0,6)$. At prices $p^{B}=$ $(1,4)$, Joe chooses the bundle $x^{B}=(4,2)$.
(a) Draw a graph showing the budget lines and the chosen bundles in these two cases. Assuming Joe's preferences are locally non-satiated, what is the largest possible upper contour set of the form $\left\{x \geq 0: u(x) \geq u\left(x^{A}\right)\right\}$ ? Show this set on your graph and give a careful verbal explanation.
(b) Assume Joe's utility function has the form $\mathrm{u}(\mathrm{x})=\mathrm{ax}_{1}+\mathrm{bx}_{2}+\mathrm{c}$. Using information already provided, what restrictions can you impose on the values of the parameters a, b , and c ? Do you know enough to compute Joe's Marshallian demand functions? Why or why not? (Note: don't try to calculate these functions, I just want to know whether you could do it in principle.)
3. Suppose Jane's Marshallian demand functions are $x_{1}=p_{2} / p_{1}$ and $x_{2}=\left(m / p_{2}\right)-1$.
(a) On one graph show Jane's income expansion path, and on another graph show her price offer curve as $\mathrm{p}_{1}$ changes. Briefly justify your answer in each case.
(b) Without using the indirect utility function or the expenditure function, show that

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\partial \mathrm{h}_{2}[\mathrm{p}, \mathrm{v}(\mathrm{p}, \mathrm{~m})] / \partial \mathrm{p}_{1}=\partial \mathrm{h}_{1}[\mathrm{p}, \mathrm{v}(\mathrm{p}, \mathrm{~m})] / \partial \mathrm{p}_{2}
$$

where $h_{i}(p, u)$ is the Hicksian demand function for good $i$.
4. Consider the indirect utility function $v(p, m)=\ln (m / 2)-\left(\ln \mathrm{p}_{1}+\ln \mathrm{p}_{2}\right) / 2$.
(a) What is the direct utility function $\mathrm{u}(\mathrm{x})$ ?
(b) Suppose there are $\mathrm{i}=1 \ldots \mathrm{n}$ consumers, each with indirect utility function $\mathrm{v}\left(\mathrm{p}, \mathrm{m}_{\mathrm{i}}\right)=$ $\ln \left(\mathrm{m}_{\mathrm{i}} / 2\right)-\left(\ln \mathrm{p}_{1}+\ln \mathrm{p}_{2}\right) / 2$ where $\mathrm{m}_{\mathrm{i}}$ is consumer i's income. Derive the aggregate demand $X^{k}\left(p_{1}, p_{2}, m_{1} \ldots m_{n}\right)$ for good $k=1,2$. Do these aggregate demands depend on how income is distributed among the consumers? Why or why not?

